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1. Introduction
Islamic finance had been originally considered as the financial system based on the notion 
of profit-sharing and participatory finance due to the fact that ribā (interest) is forbidden in Islam. 
However, since the rise in the practice of Islamic finance in the 1970s, mainly two discussions 
relating to the legitimacy of the modes of financing have been raised: one pertains to murābaḥah 
contracts and the other, to Islamic debt securities. These discussions have led to divergence in the 
practice of Islamic finance.
Existing literatures on the historical overview in Islamic economics and financial studies 
appear to opine that these discussions have roots in the dichotomy between those who attach greater 
importance to the ideal of Islamic finance and those who deem it desirable to respond to the practical 
demands of Islamic finance. Subsequently, each discussion tends to result in convergence after many 
arguments. This paper primarily aims to trace several arguments in each discussion and summarize 
them into a framework of theoretical divergence and convergence, which is premised by many 
works, regardless of whether the framework is described explicitly or implicitly.
However, the divergence/convergence framework reviewed in this paper appears to lack 
certain crucial points pertaining to the relationship among theoretical standpoints and the structure 
of discussions. Therefore, this paper examines these points by using as examples the discusisons 
on murābaḥah contracts and Islamic debt securities and aims to present an advanced picture of the 
framework beyond mere dichotomy. Furthermore, based on the overview, this paper also attempts to 
explore the underlying and essential features of Islamic finance that have been commonly shared by 
the scholars who participated in each discussion.
The following two chapters deal with the overviews of the discussions on murābaḥah and 
Islamic debt securities. The fourth chapters discusses the divergence/convergence framework within 
which the theoretical discussions on Islamic finance can be located and it also presents an advanced 
picture of the framework beyond mere dichotomy. Then, the underlying features of islamic finance 
are outlined.
2. Overview of Discussion on Murābaḥah Contracts
2.1 Background
Before the rise of the practice of Islamic banking in the 1970s, there appeared to be a consensus 
in Islamic economics regarding preferable financial instruments for Islamic banking operations1). 
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Most Islamic economists encouraged profit-sharing-based financial instruments such as muḍārabah 
and mushārakah contracts2). One of the early Islamic economists, Anwar Iqbal Qureshi had already 
mentioned about profit-sharing-based banking systems in his books published in the 1940s. He states 
“Islam prohibits interest but allows profits and partnership. If the banks, instead of allowing loans to 
the industry, become its partners, share the loss and profit with it, there is no objection against such 
banks in the Islamic system [Qureshi 1945: 158-159].” In addition to Qureshi, Mahmud Ahmad had 
also mentioned the preference of profit-sharing-based systems in the 1940s [Ahmad 1947]3).
According to the early overview by Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi, one of the economists of 
the first generation of Islamic economics, this consensus on preferable financial instruments had been 
widely shared both by experts in Islamic law and scholars specializing in economics, until the end 
of the 1960s [Siddiqi 1981: 29-37]. For example, Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr formulated the profit-
sharing-based banking system as a preferable Islamic system from the viewpoint of Islamic law 
[al-Ṣadr 1977 (1969)]. Meanwhile, Muhammad Uzair presented the core mechanism of the profit-
sharing-based banking system from the viewpoint of economics [Uzair 1955], and Siddiqi himself 
promoted such a system in his book [Siddiqi 1983a (1969)].
However, from the 1970s onward, the practice of Islamic banks did not necessarily reflect 
the theoretical suggestions made by Islamic economists prior to that period. Most Islamic banks 
mainly adopted murābaḥah contracts on their asset side as an alternative financial instrument for 
interest-based loans4). Originally, a murābaḥah contract is a form of contract wherein a seller sells 
a product to a buyer at a price comprising its wholesale cost and the seller’s margin, as agreed by 
both parties. The settlement is generally paid in installments or in the form of deferred payments. 
In modern Islamic banking, an Islamic bank buys a product specified by its customer on his behalf 
from the market and sells it to him at a price that includes the product’s cost and the bank’s profit 
(markup)5).
1)　 Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi presents this in his comprehensive overview of Islamic economics up to the 
1970s [Siddiqi 1981].
2)　 Muḍārabah contract is a form of a business contract in which one party offers capital and another party undertakes 
some business with this capital; the former is termed rabb al-māl and the latter muḍārib. Any resulting profit 
is distributed between both parties based on a previously agreed ratio, while the entire loss would be borne by 
rabb al-māl unless muḍārib is proved to be negligent. Mushārakah contract is a form of business partnership in 
which multiple parties invest. In Islamic finance, sharikah al-ʻinān uses a variation of mushārakah. Any profit 
is distributed between both parties in a previously agreed ratio according to the Ḥanafī and Ḥanbalī schools of 
Islamic law, and shared depending on the amount invested, according to the Mālikī and Shāfiʻī schools. Each 
school also consents to any loss being borne, depending on the amount invested. Investors have the right to 
participate in managing their business partnership, but this right is entrusted to each investor.
3)　 He states in his early book, “The shirakat banks would lend money to industry and commerce on the basis of 
shirakat, that is, they would share the profit with their debtors rather than burden industry and commerce with 
a fixed rate of interest [Ahmad 1947: 170].” There “shirakat” indicates the principle of mushārakah contracts. 
However, Ahmad appears to change his opinion in the 1990s. In his book published in 1992, he propounds 
the new financial instrument named TMCL (Time-Multiple Counter-Loan) which is based on qarḍ ḥasan as a 
substitute for profit-sharing-based systems [Ahmad 1992: 57-59].
4)　 On their liability side, profit-sharing-based instruments have been mainly used as a substitute for the term deposit 
account.
5)　 According to the works of Monzer Kahf and Rodney Wilson, murābaḥah contracts were discovered and strongly 
promoted by Sami Homoud [Kahf 2001: 8; Wilson 2004: 211].
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2.2 Murābaḥah Contracts in Practice
With regard to the share of murābaḥah contracts, the majority of Islamic banks in both the 
Middle East and Malaysia have shown a widespread preference for murābaḥah contracts. Such 
a preference can be observed almost throughout the period beginning from the 1980s until now. 
For example, in Al-Baraka Islamic Investment Bank in Bahrain (established in 1984), the use of 
muḍārabah contracts occupied shares of 5.4% and 2.8% in the first two years of the bank’s operation, 
while the murābaḥah contracts garnered the rest of the share [Presley 1988: 105]. In Bank Islam 
Malaysia, established in 1983 as the first Islamic commercial bank in Malaysia, murābaḥah contracts 
(including bayʻ bi-thaman ʼājil contracts that are similar to murābaḥah contracts) have also occupied 
the highest share of total financing on its asset side every year (see Table 1). To present another 
example, in Dubai Islamic Bank, which on its establishment in 1975 became the world’s first Islamic 
bank, murābaḥah contracts have occupied higher shares, even if the annual shares in the 2000s are 
smaller than those in the 1990s (see Table 2).
According to al-Harran’s aggregate calculation, it is estimated that 80-90% of financial 
instruments on the asset side of Islamic banks were murābaḥah contracts from the 1970s through the 
first half of the 1990s, which implies that the share of profit-sharing-based instruments was meager 
[al-Harran 1995: xi].
2.3 Criticisms against Murābaḥah Contracts
In response to this situation, many criticisms and arguments against this type of contract were 
advanced in Islamic economics not only because profit-sharing-based financial instruments were 
rarely used on the asset side of Islamic banks but also because murābaḥah contracts involved certain 
contentious issues from the viewpoint of Islamic jurisprudence.
With regard to the contentious issues of murābaḥah contracts, the following points are mainly 
raised: (1) two transactions in one contract, (2) possession of a specified product before agreement, 
(3) similarity between markup rate in murābaḥah contracts and interest rate in conventional loans, 
(4) binding effect of murābaḥah contracts and risk bearing, (5) time required to transfer ownership, 
and (6) penalty for delay in payment6).
The third point from among those mentioned above is particularly important and controversial 
with respect to the principle of the prohibition of ribā, which is equivalent to a bank’s interest and 
is the raison d’être of Islamic banks. Many scholars who emphasized their ideal of the Islamic 
economic system where a profit-sharing-based system achieves desirable economic performance 
from the aspect of Islam are skeptical about the legitimacy of murābaḥah contracts from the 
viewpoint of its similarity to transactions such as interest-based loans where ribā (interest) is 
charged. For example, Siddiqi is critical and mentions murābaḥah contracts in a negative context 
with saying that bayʻ muʼajjal contract (which is a contract similar to murābaḥah) is removed from 
the list of permissible methods altogether in order to save interest-free banking from being sabotaged 
6)　 For more theoretical overview of each point except the third point that is examined in this paper, see [Ray 1995] 
and [Sairally 2002].
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from within [Siddiqi 1983b: 139].
To present another example, Muhammad Taqi Usmani, who is one of the scholars in Islamic 
jurisprudence and holds a number of positions on the sharīʻah boards of Islamic financial institutions 
in the Middle East, South Asia, and the USA, propounds the restrictive use of murābaḥah contracts 
with saying that murābaḥah is only a device to escape from interest and not an ideal instrument for 
carrying out the real economic objective of Islam, therefore, its use should be restricted only to those 
cases where muḍārabah or mushārakah are not practicable [Usmani 2000: 104-105].
The reason for the criticism of murābaḥah contracts is essentially as follows. In interest-based 
loans, the customer uses the bank loan to purchase a specified product from the market and ultimately 
repays the debt by its maturity date to the bank along with interest that amounts to the bank’s profit. 
In contrast, in murābaḥah contracts, an Islamic bank purchases a specified product from the market 
on behalf of its customer and resells it to the customer at cost plus markup. Subsequently, by maturity 
date, the customer repays the debt to the bank along with the markup amount that constitutes the 
bank’s profit. In both cases, the financial instruments function as a provider of liquidity to customers 
requiring financial assistance, and the validity of the bank’s profit can be based on the logic that it 
is a counter value for providing liquidities. Therefore, this line of reasoning leads to the conclusion 
that there are no differences between interest and markup; therefore, murābaḥah contracts are 
merely an alternative form of interest-based loans. Thus, those who criticize murābaḥah contracts 
consider it unlawful because of the fact that murābaḥah contracts include a factor (markup rate) that 
is similar to ribā. Also, often Islamic banks have made use of the conventional bench mark such as 
LIBOR (London Inter-Bank Offer-Rate) to determine the profit rate or markup on the murābaḥah 
transactions [Usmani 2000: 118-120]. This has further likened murābaḥah contracts to interest-based 
loans and has added to the skepticism towards murābaḥah contracts.
2.4 Advocacy of Murābaḥah Contracts
Therefore, how do the promoters of murābaḥah contracts explain their legitimacy? One of 
the more notable explanations is found in the legal opinion (fatwā) issued at the Al-Baraka seminar 
(Nadwah al-Barakah) held under the auspices of the Dallah Albaraka Group (Majmūʻah Dallah 
al-Barakah), which is not only known as one of the largest investment and development companies 
in the Middle East but also manages many Islamic financial institutions. At its first seminar held in 
1983, the following fatwā was issued regarding the uncertainty surrounding the similarity between 
murābaḥah contracts and interest-based loans. In one part of the question, this fatwā states the 
following [ABS 1983: 8]7):
Question: Some people cast doubts on the legitimacy of murābaḥah contracts because this 
form of contracts appears to include some elements of ribā. They are also skeptical about the 
following points in the procedure of murābaḥah contracts:
1. Possession of a specified product before agreement
7)　 Translated from Arabic by the author [ABS 1983: 8].
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2. Deferred payment of the sale
3. Sales involving exchange of money for money, which is similar to currency exchange
4. Binding contracts (stipulating a promise to buy), which are prohibited by the Mālikī school of 
thought
5. Involving fabrication, which is unlawful
The third point from among these questions is related to the topic of this paper. The answer to this 
question is as follows:
Answer: In ribā-based loans, transaction is conducted in the form of exchange of similar goods. 
In such a transaction, the lender stipulates that the payment of interest (for example, 10 riyals) 
be made on the maturity date by a borrower who takes a loan of 100 riyals. In murābaḥah 
contracts, with deferred payment, a transaction is conducted in the form of exchange of different 
goods, particularly the exchange of commodities for money. A specific feature of murābaḥah 
contracts comparable to ribā-based loans is that even if the markup amount (which is the seller’s 
profit) is predetermined, the seller’s profit (and similarly, the buyer’s gain) will be influenced by 
the market price of the relevant commodity. Therefore, any profits in murābaḥah contracts are 
expressed as a function of supply and demand in the commodity market rather than the monetary 
market.
The essence of the resolution is as follows. The fatwā states that although a transaction 
involving ribā occurs when similar products (particularly monetary products) are unequally 
exchanged, with interest-based loans falling into the category of such unlawful transactions, 
murābaḥah contracts do not qualify as such transactions. This is because they involve transactions 
of different goods, which implies that bank profits can be directly influenced by market prices 
that are the true projection of the real domain of the economic system. In the case of a murābaḥah 
transaction, there is an exchange of a physical good for a monetary exchange, while in the case of 
an interest-based loan, an exchange of money for money takes place. Thus, murābaḥah contracts are 
completely different from interest-based loans and therefore are permissible. Such an explanation 
is supported by those who prioritize the competitiveness of the Islamic banking system against the 
conventional financial system.
3. Controversy in Islamic Debt Securities: Lessons from Malaysian Case
3.1 Background
After the launch of the murābaḥah-based Islamic banking system, the introduction of an 
advanced financial system was demanded in order to ensure the smooth operation and expansion 
of the Islamic financial market. Malaysia has played a leading part in the introduction of such an 
advanced system, among countries where Islamic finance has been implemented.
Therefore, Malaysia is known as the representative country that has been proactively promoting 
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the development of Islamic finance since the 1980s. In 1983, the first commercial Islamic bank in 
Malaysia, Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad, was established under the Islamic Banking Act (Act 276). 
Subsequently, Malaysia introduced the Interest-Free Banking Scheme in 1993 that allowed the then 
existing conventional financial institutions to offer Islamic financial products in their separating 
branches. In recent years, Malaysia has accelerated the open-door policy for Islamic finance. In 
2003, conventional financial institutions were allowed to establish subsidiary companies for Islamic 
financial operations. In 2005, foreign Islamic financial institutions were allowed to obtain licenses to 
establish Islamic financial institutions in Malaysia [Abdul Rahman 2007].
In parallel with these initiatives for the establishment of Islamic financial institutions, Malaysia 
has provided several subordinate infrastructures for the smooth practice of Islamic finance and for the 
expansion of Islamic financial markets. For example, the Islamic Interbank Money Market (IIMM) 
and Islamic Interbank Cheque Clearing System (IICCS) were developed with this objective in the 
early 1990s.
With regard to financial instruments, alternative Islamic securities to short-term interest-bearing 
securities, such as treasury bills, were required in order to ensure the liquidity of Islamic financial 
institutions with the expanding secondary market and to provide portfolios to customers. Since the 
early 1980s, several types of Islamic securities have been introduced. In 1983, under the Government 
Investment Act (Act 275), Bank Negara Malaysia issued non-interest-bearing securities (Governmental 
Investment Certificate, GIC) based on qarḍ ḥasan contracts8). In 1993, muḍārabah Interbank 
Investments (MIIs) based on muḍārabah contracts were issued for the IIMM. However, both 
securities based on qarḍ ḥasan contracts and muḍārabah contracts were used for specific purposes 
and were not able to gain popularity because it is difficult to trade GICs in secondary markets, and 
MIIs are plagued by the asymmetric information problem related to the profit between investor’s 
bank and investee’s [Wilson 2002: 36]9).
For more general use, Islamic debt securities based on murābaḍah contracts attracted 
considerable attention from both Islamic banks and customers10). As for Islamic banks, Islamic 
debt securities were useful for trading accounting receivables (one of the basic resources of debt 
8)　 Qarḍ ḥasan contract is a loan in which only the principal is paid back without any additional amount, i.e., an 
interest-free loan.
9)　 Many works examine the asymmetric information problem in muḍārabah contracts. One of the pioneering works 
was conducted by Waqar Masood Khan [Khan 1985].
10)　Although such securities are generally referred to as Islamic bonds or sukūk al-murābaḥah, in this paper, the 
author adopts the term Islamic debt securities because of the following reasons: (1) the term bond involves the 
concept of interest-bearing securities, for which it is inaccurate for it to be modified by the word Islam, which 
is unfamiliar with the concept of interest, (2) The term sukūk historically and theoretically covers many types 
of Islamic securities and checks, but in the context of Islamic financial studies, it was not until the 2000s that 
this term emerged. Thus, from the need to examine the relationships between murābaḥah-based securities in the 
1990s and what is referred to as sukūk (including sukūk al-murābaḥah) in the 2000s, the author distinguishes 
Islamic debt securities from sukūk. Regarding the second point, both Shamsun Hussain, who is the director of 
Debt Capital Market & Corporate Finance at CIMB Islamic Bank Berhad in Malaysia, and Zarinah Anwar, who 
is the Chairman of the Securities Commission of Malaysia, state that the first sukūk al-murābaḥah was issued by 
Shell MDS in 1990 [Hussain 2007; Anwar 2007]. However, Angelo M. Venardos mentions in his book that by 
then, Islamic debt securities based on murābaḥah contracts had started being traded in the securities markets in 
Malaysia [Venardos 2005: 165].
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securities) in the secondary market. With regard to customers, Islamic debt securities diversified 
the financing method. In accordance with these practical demands, Islamic debt securities acted as 
instruments that justified the issuance and trade of debt securities through Islamic methods developed 
by Malaysian scholars. In the process of the development of such instruments, Malaysian scholars 
encountered legal problems pertaining to both bayʻ al-ʻīnah and bayʻ al-dayn in Islamic jurisprudence. 
Bayʻ al-ʻīnah is related to the problem that arises during the process of the issuance of Islamic debt 
securities, whereas bayʻ al-dayn is related to the problem cropping up during the process of trade of 
debt securities.
3.2 Discussion on Bayʻ al-ʻĪnah
Bayʻ al-ʻīnah literally implies double sales and is basically an alternative financial arrangement 
for a customer who needs immediate cash. Instead of direct interest-based loans that are prohibited 
in Islam, an Islamic bank uses bayʻ al-ʻīnah as a means of lending through which it is able to earn 
profits. The complete procedure is outlined as follows. First, an Islamic bank (prospective creditor) 
buys some asset from a customer (prospective debtor) who needs immediate cash, and then, the 
customer immediately buys back his asset from the Islamic bank by means of a murābaḥah contract. 
The initial trade is a spot transaction, while the subsequent trade is a deferred transaction with a 
higher price than that in the initial trade. Herein, an Islamic bank provides the customer with financial 
liquidity and earns profit from the price gap between the initial and subsequent trades. When an 
Islamic bank faces a liquidity constraint before the maturity date of the subsequent trade and sells 
the accounting receivables to a third party, its receivables based on bayʻ al-ʻīnah convert into debt 
securities.
Regarding the legitimacy of bayʻ al-ʻīnah in Islamic jurisprudence, there are some 
disagreements on the matter of double sales intended to cash finance with excess repayment that 
is equivalent to charging ribā. Zuḥaylī reviews the classical literature of bayʻ al-ʻīnah in Islamic 
jurisprudence and explains that the Ḥanafī school of jurisprudence prohibits double sales except in 
the case where a third party intermediates in the trade11), whereas the Mālikī and Ḥanbalī schools 
prohibit them when the parties involved implement the sales with the consideration that such trades 
are unlawful [Zuḥaylī 2002: 45]. Meanwhile, Nik Norzrul, Thani, Mohamed Ridza Mohamed 
Abdullah and Megat Hizaini Hassan introduce the view of the Shāfiʻī school with the explanation 
that it allows double sales based on al-Shāfiʻī’s interpretation. Al-Shāfiʻī, who was the eponym of 
the Shāfiʻī school, allowed double sales because the validity of contracts is based on the external 
evidence that they have been properly concluded and that the unlawful intention of parties involved is 
immaterial unless expressed in their act [Norzrul Thani et al. 2003: 68]. In modern literature, Muslim 
scholars who do not support al-Shāfiʻī’s interpretation have cast doubts on the concept of double 
sales because such an instrument is considered a mere legal stratagem (ḥiyal) in order to superficially 
circumvent the prohibition of ribā. For example, Usmani states as follows [Usmani 2001: 113]:
11)　Abū Ḥanīfah, who was the eponym of the Ḥanafī school, also permits double sales in the case where the interval 
between the initial and subsequent trades is sufficiently long or the market price of the relevant asset increases.
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In some cases, this technique (bay‘ al-‘īnah, annotated by author) ... is nothing but to make fun 
of the original concept. In many cases it is done merely on papers without a genuine commodity 
to be sold and purchased. Moreover, this technique is applied indiscriminately to all the banking 
transactions having no regard whether or not they involve a commodity. The procedure is being 
applied to all the types of finances including financing overhead expenses, payment bills etc. ... 
This system cannot be held as immune from being declared as repugnant to the Holy Qurʼān and 
Sunnah.
Meanwhile, Malaysian scholars who engage in practical judgments tend to allow double sales 
by adopting the general interpretations of the Shāfiʻī school. One crucial statement was issued by 
the Sharīʻah Advisory Council of Securities Commission in Malaysia. At its 5th meeting (held on 
January 29, 1997), the resolution that permitted double sales was issued with the following statement 
[SC 2002: 22]:
From the study done on the opinions of past Islamic jurists on the issues of bayʻ al-‘īnah, the 
SAC (Sharī‘ah Advisory Council) decided to accept the opinions of the Shāfiʻī and Ẓāhirī 
madhhab in permitting bayʻ al-ʻīnah. Therefore, it can be developed into a product for the 
Islamic capital market in Malaysia.
A similar statement was issued by the Sharʻīah Advisory Council of Bank Negara Malaysia. At its 
8th meeting (held on December 23, 1998), the following resolution was issued [BNM 2007: 26]:
The Council … resolved that bayʻ al-‘īnah transaction in the Islamic Interbank Money Market is 
permissible based on the following conditions: (1) bayʻ al-ʻīnah transaction must strictly follow the 
mechanism which is accepted by the Shāfiʻī school; and (2) the transacted asset is not a ribāwī item.
It is clear that both resolutions strongly depend on the view of the Shāfiʻī school. However, recent 
works by Rosly and Sanusi raise doubts on the validity of al-Shāfiʻī’s interpretation, which is the 
main source of the above two resolutions. They point out that there is hardly any satisfactory evidence 
that can enable one to say that al-Shāfiʻī has expressly declared that double sales are allowed [Rosly 
and Sanusi 2001: 276]. In reaction to such an academic trend, the following resolutions issued by the 
Council in the Regional Sharīʻah Dialogue were added to its original resolutions (held in June 28–
29, 2006) [BNM 2007: 27]:
The Council … resolved that: (1) the permissibility of bayʻ al-ʻīnah … is still a matter of 
juristic disagreement among the Sharī‘ah scholars backed by their own basis of jurifications; 
… (3) Bayʻ al-‘īnah is still necessary in the context of local Islamic finance development. 
However, the market players are required to strengthen and enhance the operational processes 
and documentation to comply with the features of bayʻ al-ʻīnah as permitted; and (4) Since 
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bayʻ al-ʻīnah concepts is still regarded as a matter of juristic disagreement among the Sharīʻah 
scholars, it is more desirable that Islamic financial institutions to limit its use in products which 
face difficulty in structuring them based on other consensually accepted contracts.
This resolution implies that Malaysia attempted to change its own position on bayʻ al-ʻīnah, that is, 
double sales for financial liquidity and issuance of securities were used as a second-best instrument; 
in order to satisfy these financial needs, it is mandatory to develop alternatives to bayʻ al-ʻīnah. This 
change in Malaysia’s position appears to be connected with the movement aiming to standardize the 
theory of Islamic finance, which is initiated by Malaysia.
3.3 Discussion on Bayʻ al-Dayn
In a simple murābaḥah contract between an Islamic bank (first party) and a customer (second 
party), the former holds accounting receivables for cash that the latter agrees to pay for his product. When 
there is a need for immediate cash, an Islamic bank sells its receivables to the third party. Bayʻ al-dayn 
implies such a trade of debt securities or receivables between the first and third parties. By the maturity 
date, the third party receives cash from the second party. This financial method is considerably 
convenient for those who hold debt securities but face liquidity constraints.
However, there are some disagreements on the matter of the trade of debt securities in Islamic 
jurisprudence12). In particular, as Rosly and Sanusi indicate, the problem pertaining to debt securities 
occurs when they are traded between the first and third parties at discounted prices [Rosly and 
Sanusi 1999]. In the literature on classical Islamic jurisprudence, trade of debt securities between 
the first and third parties at discounted prices is unanimously prohibited [Zuḥaylī 1998: 24-25]13), 
and in modern literature, a majority of Muslim scholars in the Middle East support the classical 
interpretation. For example, the Islamic Fiqh Academy, one of the most influential associations in 
Islamic jurisprudence, does not permit the trade of debt securities between the first and third parties 
at discounted prices. At the 11th Session of the Council of the Islamic Fiqh Academy (held in 
Manama, November 14-19, 1998), the following resolution was issued [IFA 2000: 234-235]14):
It is not permissible to sell a deferred debt by the non debtor for a prompt cash, from its type 
or otherwise, because this results in ribā (usury). Likewise, it is not permissible to sell it for a 
deferred cash, from its type or otherwise, because it is similar to the sale of a debt for a debt, 
which is prohibited in Islam. There is no difference whether the debt is the result of a loan or 
whether it is a deferred sale15).
12)  Trading receivables between the first and second parties at any price is permissible [Rosly and Sanusi 1999; Rosly 
2005: 437-439].
13)  Trade between the first and third parties at par prices is also permissible with some conditions [Rosly and Sanusi 
1999; Rosly 2005: 437-439].
14)  This quoted passage is a part of Resolution No. 101 (4/11) on Debt Sale and Loan Debentures and Their Islamic 
Substitutes in Public and Private Sectors.
15)  In this resolution, “sell a deferred debt” implies the trade of debt securities at a discounted price because 
immediately after the quoted passage, this resolution emphasizes the previous resolution regarding the prohibition 
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Further, as is the case with bayʻ al-ʻīnah, it is widely considered that some Malaysian scholars 
tend to allow the trade of debt securities between the first and third parties at discounted prices and 
that their “moderate” interpretations of such transactions support and enhance broader Islamic finance 
practices in Malaysia. There are three explanations offered for legitimate bayʻ al-dayn between the 
first and third parties at discounted prices in the following points: (1) authenticity of the prohibition 
of trade of debt securities, (2) uncertainty over delivery, and (3) type of trade. Mohammad Hashim 
Kamali, who taught Islamic law and jurisprudence at the International Islamic University, Malaysia, 
explains the legitimacy of bayʻ al-dayn with regard to every point [Kamali 2000: 128-129]. On the 
first point, he argues by quoting Siddīq al-Ḍarīr’s statement that there is no textual injunction that 
declares such a trade as forbidden. On the second point, he also quotes al-Ḍarīr in saying that claims 
of uncertainty over delivery are unwarranted if the debt is not disputed by the first party who clearly 
admits his obligation and shows a readiness to discharge it. On the third point, by referring to many 
Ḥanafī and Mālikī jurists as well as to Ibn Taymīya, he validates such a trade on the grounds that the 
debt is as good as a tangible asset, which implies that the trade of debt securities between the first 
and third parties at discounted prices amounts not to monetary but goods exchange.
In Malaysia, some official statements that permit the trade of debt securities between the first 
and third parties at discounted prices were issued on the advice of academic scholars such as Kamali. 
One crucial statement was issued by the Sharī‘ah Advisory Council of Securities Commission. At its 
2nd meeting (held on August 21, 1996), the resolution that permits such a trade was issued with the 
following statement [SC 2002: 19]:
The argument of the Islamic jurists that prohibited bayʻ al-dayn to a third party for fear that 
the buyer will have to bear great risk (Ḥanafī madhhab) has some truth in it. This is especially 
true if there is an absence of supervision and control. ... In Malaysian context, the debt securities 
instruments based on the principle of bayʻ al-dayn are regulated by Bank Negara Malaysia and the 
Commission to safeguard the right of the parties involved in the contract. Therefore, the conditions 
set by Mālikī madhhab and the fears of risks by Ḥanafī madhhab can be overcome by regulation 
and surveillance.
This statement is based on the second explanation (uncertainty over delivery) for legitimacy. 
Although the Sharī‘ah Advisory Council clearly mentions the first and third points, it places 
considerable importance on the second point in the context of capital markets. Another crucial 
statement was made by Othman Hj Ishak, who was the Chairman of the Sharīʻah Advisory Council 
of Bank Negara Malaysia, 1997-1999. At the International Capital Market Conference (held in Kuala 
Lumpur, July 15–16, 1997), he stated as follows [Ishak 1997]16):
Can ḥaqq al-dayn (be) sold at a lower price? The answer is yes, because it is not a currency and 
of the trade of discounted commercial papers. For the previous resolution, see [IFA 2000: 135].
16)　Ishak’s statement is quoted from [Siddiqi 2005: 115-116].
08Nagaoka図表配置_字下げ.indd   81 2008/05/20   11:06:19
82
イスラーム世界研究（2007）2 号
the attributes transferred when bought consist of ḥaqq al-māl not currency. … Based on the 
above, if the initial seller is willing to reduce his right and give the third party the full right, it is 
not at all against sharīʻah principles. The same with share certificates traded, it is an ownership 
right in a company and when sold in the secondary market the price is essentially different from 
the initial price.
His statement is based on the third point (type of the trade). He considers the trade of debt securities 
between the first and third parties at discounted prices as not monetary but goods exchange that is 
separate from the initial trade between the first and second parties. Thus, he permits such a trade by 
legitimating discount selling by the second party.
4. Divergence/Convergence Framework and Analytical Reflections
4.1 Divergence/Convergence Framework on Theoretical Discussions in Islamic Finance
This section discusses the divergence/convergence framework within which the theoretical 
discussions examined above can be located. Such a framework is premised by many works on the 
historical overview of Islamic finance, irrespective of whether the framework is described explicitly 
or implicitly.
In the case of murābaḥah contracts, the discussion arises between those who emphasize the 
ideal of the Islamic economic system wherein profit-sharing-based instruments achieve desirable 
economic performance from the aspect of Islam and those who prioritize the competitiveness of the 
Islamic financial system over that of the conventional financial system. Furthermore, the former 
group criticizes murābaḥah contracts, whereas the latter permits and promotes them. Regarding 
regional differences, the critics and promoters are observed both in the Middle East and Malaysia. 
Along with the critics mentioned above (Siddiqi and Usmani who mainly play an active role in 
the Middle East), some Malaysian scholars, who emphasize the profit-sharing-based system as 
an ideal of the Islamic economic system, also raise questions pertaining to the leading practice of 
murābaḥah contracts by Islamic finance in Malaysia [Man 1988; Sum 1995]. With regard to the 
promoters, Abdul Halim Ismail [Ismail 1987], who was the managing director of the Bank Islam 
Malaysia Berhad and is currently a member of the Sharī‘ah Advisory Council of Bank Negara 
Malaysia, strongly supports the use of murābaḥah contracts, as revealed in the Al-Baraka seminar’s 
fatwā mentioned above. Therefore, the discussion on murābaḥah contracts does not reflect regional 
differences.
It is reasonable to suggest that the permissive view supported by the promoters almost 
constitutes the mainstream view among a majority of practitioners of Islamic finance and scholars 
who, in particular, served as legal advisors [Rosly 2005: 93]. Many papers and books in the 
practical field began providing explanations for Islamic finance since by then murābaḥah contracts 
had already been accorded the status of financial instruments. The widespread acceptance of the 
permissive view on murābaḥah contracts was influenced by the practices in Pakistan and Iran where 
although profit-sharing-based financial instruments were strongly advocated, the 1980s witnessed 
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unsatisfactory performances of these financial instruments. Accordingly, they lost practical interest in 
profit-sharing-based banking as a feasible system and instead showed interest in the more advanced 
financial system based on fundamental Islamic instruments, including murābaḥah contracts. For 
example, a book that compiles the Sharīʻah resolutions issued by the Sharīʻah Advisory Council of 
Bank Negara Malaysia since 1997 has not mentioned anything about murābaḥah contracts till date 
[BNM 2007]17). To sum up, it can be said that the discussion on murābaḥah contracts converged on a 
practical ground as far as commercial banking practices are concerned18).
With regard to the discussion on Islamic debt securities, the division between the critics and the 
promoters directly overlaps with the regional differences in the 1990s. On the one hand, a majority of 
scholars and practitioners in Islamic countries (mainly in the Middle East), except Malaysia, adopt a 
restrictive attitude toward Islamic debt securities based on bayʻ al-ʻīnah and bayʻ al-dayn; on the 
other hand, those in Malaysia—the active promoters of Islamic finance and Islamic debt securities—
exhibit a permissive attitude. It was revealed that such a division stems from the difference in the 
interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence. It is well said that since the Malaysian interpretation is a 
more “moderate” view catering to practical demand, these instruments are permitted. In contrast, it 
is said that the interpretation by scholars in the Middle East is rather “rigid,” leading them to prohibit 
the use of such instruments.
In the 2000s, as observed in the case of bayʻ al-ʻīnah, Malaysia began to transform its policy 
toward the adoption of other financial instruments as an alternative to Islamic debt securities, based 
on bayʻ al-ʻīnah and bayʻ al-dayn. Table 3 shows that in 2006, the type of Islamic securities issued in 
Malaysia majorly changed from murābaḥah-based securities (Islamic debt securities) to muḍārabah 
and mushārakah-based securities (commonly called sukūk al-muḍārabah and sukūk al-mushārakah), 
implying the breakaway from the dependence on bayʻ al-ʻīnah and bayʻ al-dayn instruments. One 
practical reason for such a shift was that the considerable and widespread development of Islamic 
finance initiated by Malaysia needed to attract more funds from outside Malaysia, particularly from the 
Gulf countries where the majority of Muslim scholars strictly prohibited bayʻ al-ʻīnah and bayʻ al-dayn. 
Moreover, the theoretical maintenance of sukūk, particularly the development and diversification 
of sukuk products, influenced this change. Sukūk al-muḍārabah and sukūk al-mushārakah serve as 
tradable securities by ensuring adequate liquidity; further, they adequately ensure the legitimacy of 
financial instruments without using the scheme of either bayʻ al-ʻīnah or bayʻ al-dayn. Considering 
such a practical transformation that was supported by theoretical evolutions in the field of Islamic 
securities, it can be regarded that the discussion on Islamic debt securities in the overall scenario 
appears to converge on an “integrated” or “standardized” point with the Malaysian and Middle 
Eastern viewpoints.
17)　The Sharīʻah Advisory Council of Bank Negara Malaysia was established on May 1, 1997.
18)　Recently the arguments on the application of profit-sharing-based instruments are studied in the context of rural 
development and poverty reduction (see al-Harran [1995] and the special issue on mushārakah contracts in Arab 
Law Quarterly 14(3), 1999). 
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4.2 Reflections from the Divergence/Convergence Framework
Based on the divergence/convergence framework shown above, this section considers the 
following two points to be examined in order to present an advanced picture of the framework 
beyond mere dichotomy: (1) a relationship between the two theoretical standpoints and (2) setting 
a theoretical dichotomy. The first point is examined in the case of the discussion on murābaḥah 
contracts, whereas the second is studied in the case of the discussion on Islamic debt securities.
According to the framework, the permissive view on murābaḥah contracts is a convergent 
point at least in the practical field. Given this, do the critics of murābaḥah contracts not support 
any of its implications pertaining to the practice of Islamic finance? The answer to this is “yes.” As 
Rodney Wilson points out, murābaḥah contracts were arguably one of the driving forces that enabled 
Islamic banking to take off in the 1970s and that proved to be a viable alternative to conventional 
banking. However, many Islamic banks did not ignore the critics of murābaḥah contracts; instead, 
they were prepared to offer alternative instruments (ijārah, ijārah wa iqtināʼ, and istiṣnāʻ) to 
murābaḥah contracts in order to counter criticism [Wilson 2004: 212-213]. In addition, Ibrahim 
Warde mentions that as a result of the criticism of murābaḥah contracts, many Islamic banks started 
phasing out elements of murābaḥah contracts that had been subject to criticism [Warde 2000: 134]. 
In the practical field, there are also proponents of a mode of financing that involves profit-sharing 
instruments. For example, Saeed al-Ghamdi, who is the Deputy General Manager at Al-Rajhi Bank 
in Saudi Arabia, argues that the present emphasis on murābaḥah contracts is allowable; however, this 
system should be phased out once Islamic banking evolves into a much bigger and more developed 
system19). As pointed out by Tag El-Din, quoting from the 1997 report published by the International 
Association of Islamic Banks, there is evidence that the use of variable return modes of financing 
by Islamic banks and financial institutions has increased over time: 255 of total financing of Islamic 
banks and financial institutions represented either muḍārabah (6%) or mushārakah (19%) [Tag 
El-Din 2002: 11]. This compares with the 80-90% share of financing that murābaḥah  contracts 
represented between the 1970s-1990s.
Therefore, it can be considered that although most Islamic banks mainly use murābaḥah 
contracts as a practical tool for financing, they are always driven toward the profit-sharing-based 
banking system by the critics. Simultaneously, it can be also said that the critics play an important 
role in preventing Islamic banks from deviating from the principle of Islamic banking; this is because 
murābaḥah contracts, as already mentioned in this paper, are said to closely correspond to interest-
based loans that are prohibited in Islam. Consequently, the relation between the critics and the 
promoters of murābaḥah contracts is not incompatible but complementary in the current situation.
Regarding the second point to be examined, the setting of a theoretical dichotomy in the 
discussion on Islamic debt securities needs to be reconsidered. As already mentioned, it was revealed 
that the Malaysian interpretations for bayʻ al-ʻīnah and bayʻ al-dayn are more “moderate” and 
suitable for practical demand, whereas the interpretation by the Middle Eastern scholars is rather 
“rigid”. In these literatures, the words of “moderate” and “rigid” reflect some extent of interpretations 
19)　Al-Ghamdi’s argument is quoted from [Sum 1995: 95].
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in Islamic jurisprudence. However, the criterion of the classifications is not necessarily clear. For 
example, if the degree of rigidness is measured by the extent of allegiance to textual injunction (Qurʼān 
and Ḥadīth), it can be said that Kamali’s first explanation to legitimate bayʻ al-dayn (authenticity 
of the prohibition of the trade of debt securities) is dependent on the more “rigid” (not “moderate”) 
interpretation. Thus, the division between the critics and the promoters of Islamic debt securities does 
not appear to stem from the dichotomy between the moderate and rigid interpretations; it emerges 
from the interpretational diversity instead, which implies that both standpoints are not conflicting 
with each other from the interpretational aspect but from the aspect of the relation to only practical 
demand. This is why the new phase of Islamic securities that were initiated in the 2000s cannot be 
termed a “middle” point between the two standpoints but as an “integrated” or “standardized” point.
4.3 Beyond the Divergence/Convergence Framework: Exploring the Underlying Feature of 
Islamic Finance
Finally, the discussions mentioned above are explored from a standpoint beyond that of the 
divergence/convergence framework. To this end, a reexamination of each discussion highlights that 
all the scholars who participated in these discussions almost shared one common perception on 
Islamic finance, related to the nature and the categorization of transactions.
In the discussion on murābaḥah contracts, while the critics describe them as money 
transactions, the promoters describe them as product sales for cash. Similarly, in the discussion on 
Islamic debt securities, the critics explain that such a form of transaction is already separated by the 
original product sales, which implies that they do not describe the trade of debt securities as an asset-
based transaction, but only as a transaction involving monetary exchange. On the other hand, the 
promoters emphasize the strong association between the product sold by the second and third parties 
based on Ishak’s [1997] abovementioned argument.
From such a brief review of each discussion from the aspect of the form of trade, we can 
gain awareness on clear contrasts between the critics and promoters of the instruments. While 
these instruments are disapproved by the critics because they are unbalanced money exchanges, 
they are approved by the promoters on account of being good trades. This indicates that whether 
or not a certain transaction is allowed depends on whether or not it is considered or categorized 
an unbalanced monetary exchange or a good trade. In other words, the principle that unbalanced 
monetary exchanges are not permissible whereas good trades are, is a common perception among 
the discussants. Hence, disputes stem from a difference in the interpretation of the classification of 
transactions. The argument by Chapra and Khan [2000] appears to reinforce the persuasiveness of 
this statement because they changed their opinion on the trade of debt securities on a case-by-case 
basis. In their argument, on one hand, they do not allow the trade of debt securities in the classical 
era because it constitutes unbalanced monetary exchange; on the other hand, they permit the trade of 
debt securities operated by modern Islamic banks because it is based on murābaḥah contracts, which 
is considered good trade [Chapra and Khan 2000: 77].
Considering the above standpoint of analyzing the underlying features of Islamic finance, 
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it can be said that the accumulation of wealth through money-chained transactions is considered 
highly unacceptable in Islamic finance. Meanwhile, Islamic finance strongly adheres to financial 
transactions that involve real assets or those that can be retrieved from the assets. This indicates that 
Islamic finance is highly involved in the real domain of the economic system. Speaking ambitiously, 
Islamic finance does not confine itself to only the monetary domain of the economic system, but 
includes the entire economy. This should certainly be the underlying and essential feature of Islamic 
finance. In this sense, such a feature might remind us of the pre-modern economic system in the 
Islamic world where financial sectors were embedded in the real domain of the economic system20).
With regard to the current trend of Islamic finance, even if sukūk products (sukūk 
al-muḍārabah, sukūk al-mushārakah and sukūk al-ʼijārah), which are alternatively known as ABSs 
(asset-backed securities), are considered very modern and specific financial instruments, they share 
the underlying feature of Islamic finance mentioned above. Thus, in this sense, it can be said that 
sukūk products are not subdivisions of the Islamic financial or the Islamic economic system but that 
they are orthodox successors of the system.
5. Conclusion
This paper outlined two theoretical discussions on the financial instruments used in Islamic 
finance (murābaḥah contracts, Islamic debt securities), and aimed to summarize them into a 
framework of theoretical divergence and convergence, which is premised by many works, regardless 
of whether the framework is described explicitly or implicitly. In the case of murābaḥah contracts, 
the discussion arises between those who emphasize the ideal of the Islamic economic system wherein 
profit-sharing-based instruments achieve desirable economic performance from the aspect of Islam, 
then criticizes murābaḥah contracts, and those who prioritize the practical competitiveness of the 
Islamic financial system over that of the conventional financial system, then permits and promotes 
them. In the end, the permissive view supported by the promoters almost constitutes the mainstream 
view among a majority of practitioners of Islamic finance and scholars. With regard to the discussion 
on Islamic debt securities, the division between the critics and the promoters directly overlaps with 
the regional differences in the 1990s. On the one hand, a majority of scholars and practitioners in 
the Middle East adopt a restrictive attitude toward Islamic debt securities based on bayʿ al-ʿīnah and 
bayʿ al-dayn; on the other hand, those in Malaysia exhibit a permissive attitude. It was revealed that 
such a division stems from the difference in the interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence. However, in 
the 2000s Malaysia began to transform its policy toward the adoption of other financial instruments 
(sukūk al-muḍārabah and sukūk al-mushārakah) as an alternative to Islamic debt securities, based 
on bayʿ al-ʿīnah and bayʿ al-dayn. Therefore, it can be concluded that the discussion on Islamic debt 
securities in the overall scenario appears to converge on an “integrated” or “standardized” point with 
the Malaysian and Middle Eastern viewpoints.
Based on the divergence/convergence framework shown above, this paper considered three 
20)　Udovitch describes such a situation in the pre-modern Islamic economic system as “bankers without banks” 
[Udovitch 1979: 255].
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points pertaining to (1) the relationship among theoretical standpoints and (2) the dichotomic 
structure of discussions (3) the underlying feature of Islamic finance in order to present an 
advanced picture beyond the existing framework. As for the first point, it can be said that in the 
case of murābaḥah contracts the relation between the critics and the promoters is not incompatible 
but complementary in the current situation. That is because the critics play an important role in 
preventing Islamic banks from deviating from the principle of Islamic finance, then the promoters 
are always driven toward the profit-sharing-based banking system by the critics. Regarding the 
second point, it can be considered that in the case of Islamic debt securities the division between 
the critics and the promoters does not appear to stem from the dichotomy between the moderate and 
rigid interpretations; it emerges from the interpretational diversity instead, which implies that both 
standpoints are not conflicting with each other from the interpretational aspect but from the aspect 
of the relation to only practical demand. That is because in the existing literatures the criterion of 
the classifications between “moderate” and “rigid” is not necessarily clear, therefore, if the degree 
of rigidness is measured by the extent of allegiance to textual injunction (Qurʾān and Ḥadīth), for 
example, it can be said that Kamali’s explanation to legitimate bayʿ al-dayn that is said to represent 
the “moderate” view in the practical criterion is dependent on the more “rigid” (not “moderate”) 
interpretation. With regard to the third point, it is discovered that all the scholars who participated in 
these discussions almost shared one common perception that whether or not a certain transaction is 
allowed depends on whether or not it is considered or categorized an unbalanced monetary exchange 
or a good trade. This insight can lead the following implication related to the underlying feature of 
Islamic finance; Islamic finance strongly adheres to the financial transactions that involve real assets 
or those that can be retrieved from the assets while the accumulation of wealth by money-chained 
transactions is considered highly unacceptable in Islamic finance.
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1984 86.3 4.3 9.3 0.1 100
1985 91.2 2.9 5.9 0.0 100
1986 92.5 2.5 4.8 0.2 100
1987 93.7 2.4 3.4 0.5 100
1988 94.3 0.1 3.1 2.5 100
1989 94.3 0.1 3.0 2.6 100
1990 86.7 0.1 10.9 2.3 100
1991 85.0 0.1 12.4 2.5 100
1992 86.9 0.6 10.3 2.2 100
1993 86.0 1.9 9.7 2.4 100
1994 86.6 2.0 8.5 2.9 100
1995 89.1 1.9 6.5 2.5 100
1996 89.4 1.9 7.0 1.7 100
1997 90.6 1.5 5.2 2.7 100
1998 90.1 1.0 4.2 4.7 100
1999 90.5 1.1 3.9 4.5 100
2000 91.3 0.7 2.3 5.7 100
2001 85.3 3.6 2.1 9.0 100
2002 82.8 4.1 4.7 8.4 100
2003 83.1 3.6 3.5 9.8 100
2004 89.1 1.1 1.8 8.0 100
2005 84.1 0.7 3.4 11.8 100
2006 77.5 0.7 3.1 18.7 100
Ave. 88.1 1.7 5.6 4.6 100
*1: murābaḥah includes bayʻ bi-thaman ājil
Sources: Calculated from BIMB Annual Reports, 1984-2006 (Data from 1984 to 1987 are cited from 
[Sum 1995: 95]).
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Table 2





1988 90.4 2.0 7.6 0.0 100
1989 92.4 1.9 5.7 0.0 100
1990 91.7 2.3 6.0 0.0 100
1991 92.8 1.9 5.3 0.0 100
1992 73.4 3.5 7.1 16.0 100
1993 75.9 4.9 6.3 12.9 100
1994 69.5 5.7 6.6 18.2 100
1995 60.2 5.1 8.1 26.6 100
2001 51.7 14.0 2.6 31.7 100
2002 50.4 14.6 6.6 28.4 100
2003 46.6 15.4 17.4 20.6 100
2004 48.3 15.2 23.5 13.0 100
2005 46.7 26.5 17.3 9.5 100
2006 51.9 16.9 17.4 13.8 100
Ave. 67.3 9.3 9.8 13.6 100
Sources: Calculated from DIB Annual Reports, 1988-1995, 2001-2006 (Data from 1988 to 1995 are 
cited from [Dawābah 2003: 22]).
Table 3





2001 87.0 0.0 0.0 13.0 100
2002 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100
2003 53.5 0.0 0.0 46.5 100
2004 95.2 0.0 2.0 2.8 100
2005 69.8 12.8 2.9 14.5 100
2006 15.6 77.5 4.9 2.1 100
*1: murābaḥah includes bayʻ bi-thaman ājil
Sources: Calculated from Securities Commission Annual Reports, 2000-2006.
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